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On 1 April 2007 an act became effective which
will radically change the German system of health
care: the GKV-Wettbewerbsstärkungsgesetz (Social
Health Insurance Pro Competition Act; henceforth
cited as GKV-WSG). The list of provisions is long
and diverse. It includes mandatory coverage for
everyone by 2009, extended outpatient care by hos-
pitals, new rules for pricing the services supplied by
physicians in free practice and strengthened efficien-
cy requirements for the approval of prescription
drugs. Above all, the law changes the contractual
relationships between the insured, the suppliers of
insurance and the providers of health care services.
The reform aims at fostering competition in the
health care sector. This dominating objective
explains the act’s name. From an economic point of
view the most interesting provisions are
• granting extended autonomy to the social health
insurance (SHI) sickness funds which enables
them to contract selectively with the suppliers of
health care services
• breaking with a regime under which the sickness
funds compete for membership by means of
wage-related contribution rates and moving
towards competition on the basis of payroll-tax
financed vouchers
• obligating private insurers to transfer accumulat-
ed premium reserves when an insured switches to
another insurance plan.
It is too early to evaluate the reform empirically.The
reform is far-reaching and the players in the health
care sector still have to adapt to the new rules of the
game. Hence it must suffice to describe the relevant
provisions and to discuss in non-technical terms the
effects that the reform is expected to have.
Some basic features of the German health care 
system
Even before the reform 99.75 percent of the popula-
tion was covered by health insurance.The remaining
0.25 percent had fallen through holes in the system
which the reform eliminates. In the eyes of Germans
their health system excels because of its high stan-
dards and unrestricted access to care providers.1
Until recently queuing has not been a topic.All this
may explain that some institutional peculiarities
have evolved that external observers may find
strange.One such peculiarity is the division of health
insurance into public and private spheres.
Almost 90 percent of the population is covered by
the public system. Constituent features of the sys-
tem are mandatory membership and wage-related
finance. Membership is compulsory for those wage
earners who are not civil servants and whose month-
ly earnings do not exceed EUR 4,050 in 2009. High
wage income earners, civil servants and the self-
employed are able to opt for private insurance.
Until recently the SHI has been providing full insur-
ance. There has been no real need to buy supple-
mental coverage. In 2003 only eleven percent of the
insured held such supplemental insurance. Under
the umbrella of the SHI some 187 independent sick-
ness funds compete for membership. Until 2008
these funds differed primarily by the contribution
rate they charged. As differences in benefits were
negligible as a result of regulation and competition,
one would have expected to observe no noticeable
differences in contribution rates. The contrary is
true, however, and difficult to rationalize. Just
before changing the finance system the contribution
rates varied between 13.4 and 16.7 percent.Another
peculiarity of the SHI is the provision that not full
wages are subject to contribution but only wages up
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1 According to a survey of the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach
published in August 2009,64 percent of the population find the per-
formance of the German health care system “good”or “very good”.to a limit (“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”). Further-
more and as a general principle, employer and em-
ployee share the contribution equally. This burden
sharing is called parity finance and can be traced
back to the very beginnings of social insurance
under Bismarck in 1883. As the contributions are
income related and not risk related and as the costs
of insurance increase with age,demographic change,
and the implications of medical technical progress,
the SHI is building up sizable future liabilities. The
sustainability gap is estimated by Raffelhüschen et
al. (2007) to reach the order of 90 percent of GDP.
The premiums of the private insurance are risk relat-
ed and not community rated. They are calculated
with the objective that they would not increase with
age if only average health care costs did not increase.
Ex ante redistribution works only intertemporally
and not interpersonally. A private insurance plan
combines pure risk insurance with saving.Before the
GKV-WSG became effective, the insured had no
right,however,to transfer accumulated savings when
switching to another insurance plan. This lack of
portability meant a great obstacle to switching and
one which increased progressively with age.
Among the features that were often criticized in the
German public debate before the GKV-WSG
became effective are the following:
(i) the method of relating SHI contributions to
wages with the effect that any increase in health
costs pushes up wage costs
(ii) the fact that contributions for SHI are not
levied on capital and high wage income 
(iii) the coexistence of private and public insurance
systems which allows high
wage income earners, civil
servants and the self-em-
ployed to avoid the income
redistributive financing of
health costs
(iv) the lack of portability of
savings in private insurance
plans, which makes switch-
ing insurance unattractive
In contrast, the following fea-
tures were seldom the subject of
public criticism:
(v) efficiency deficits revealed
by international compari-
sons of health care
(vi) missing options for the insured to choose
among different forms of organizing the doctor-
patient relationship including managed care
Equity and efficiency deficiencies in German 
health care
The equity deficiencies are obvious and have been
the object of much criticism.The coexistence of two
insurance systems which allows privileged groups of
individuals to escape the redistributive financing of
SHI cannot be rationalized economically. It can only
be understood from a politico-historical perspective.
Equally unconvincing and inefficient (Breyer and
Haufler 2000) is the tradition financing social health
costs according to principles of equity which strong-
ly deviate from the principles governing income tax-
ation. The German health care system, however,
fares no better with respect to allocational efficiency.
There is ample evidence. OECD Health Data 2008
reveal that Germany ranks 4th among OECD coun-
tries in health spending if measured as share of GDP
but only 18th with regard to life expectancy at birth.
The German spending share stands high at 10.7 per-
cent while the average is 9.0 percent. Higher shares
are only reached by the US (15.3), Switzerland
(11.6), and France (11.1). Life expectancy at birth is
79.0 years in Germany, which is little more than the
OECD average of 78.6 years (see Figure).
Afonso (2004) and Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005)
analyze efficiency more systematically. They use
infant mortality as a second measure of health at-
tainment and they apply Free Disposable Hull and
Data Envelopment Analysis.By means of these non-
parametric methods they are able to rank 24 OECD
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countries according to the efficiency attained in the
production of health. In four different rankings
Germany does not appear among the 17 most effi-
cient countries. The computed ranks lie between 18
and 22 depending on which method is applied and
on whether the inefficiency is expressed in terms of
input or output. Clearly such a disappointing effi-
ciency performance must have reasons.The interna-
tional comparison is strongly suggestive of the fol-
lowing:
• excessive capacities in acute hospital care:
According to OECD Health Data the German
number of acute hospital beds stood at 6.2 per
1,000 population in 2006 with an OECD average
of 3.9
• uncoordinated competition between hospitals
and self-employed specialists in outpatient treat-
ment
• lack of options for the insured to choose among
managed and non-managed care
The latter two characteristics are related and in the
following discussion they are both meant when
referring to the unconstrained right to visit any
provider of health care (“free access”).According to
a widely held opinion in Germany,generous hospital
capacities and unconstrained access to health care
providers are highly ranked social achievements.The
fact that other countries rely on less generous capac-
ities and on constrained access is no reason to ques-
tion one’s own policies. It is hardly ever acknowl-
edged that the medical benefit may not justify the
cost. The economist may find such an attitude
strange and ask which specific institutional features
explain the growth and preservation of structures
suspected to be inefficient by international stan-
dards. Some probable answers are presented in the
next section.
The probable institutional reasons for inefficiency
German hospital capacities are the result of govern-
ment planning. Noteworthy are the following char-
acteristics. First, deficient capacities are established
when the local number of beds falls short of the
countrywide average. In doing so one ignores the
fact that a filled bed need not be one needed. Yet
Romer’s Law suggests that a “built bed is a filled
bed” (Kopetsch 2006). Secondly, the employed
method of hospital finance enables political deciders
to externalize costs. The method is called dual
finance and it implies that only the cost of infra-
structure is borne by the local state while the vari-
able cost of utilization is covered by the health insur-
ances of the beneficiaries of medical treatment.The
insurers, however, have no right to restrict utiliza-
tion. Free access to health care providers includes
the free choice of hospitals. As a result the variable
hospital costs are spread uniformly across the coun-
try while the benefits are regionally concentrated.
There is no regional equivalence of costs and bene-
fits. Instead, providing hospital beds is a policy by
which a state is able to externalize costs. This is the
most plausible explanation for apparent excess
capacities. It would however not suffice just to grant
the insurers the right to restrict access to hospitals.
Much depends, as is argued below, on the insurers’
incentives to improve efficiency.
Up to 2008 the competition among SHI sickness
funds was strongly distorted.The reason is the use of
distortive instruments (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat
2004). The funds did not compete in prices but in
wage-related contribution rates. The result was that
the insured with low incomes paid only a fraction of
the costs of their own insurance demand. Parity
finance implied a further halving.The employer bore
half of the costs although having no say in selecting
the insurer. It was as if the demand for insurance
were subsidized, with the rate of subsidization being
the larger the smaller the income earned. Only very
high income earners were effectively taxed. But
those earners tend to be households with less elastic
demand. Under such rules, the economist would
expect sickness funds to compete primarily by
expanding the benefit package. As all funds faced
the same incentives one would expect to observe
benefit packages dominating the market that were
inefficiently generous from a social perspective.
The lack of managed-care options can be rational-
ized along such lines. One only has to interpret the
free access to health-care providers as a marginal
expansion of benefits. According to this rationaliza-
tion sickness funds did not offer insurance plans with
constrained access because demand was expected to
be weak.Whether this is true or not, it is striking for
an economist to observe that 187 competitors today
– and even more in the past – choose not to differ-
entiate the benefit packages they offer.Market com-
petition which brings about no diversity is extremely
unusual. It has pathogenic features and calls for
explanation. The competing rationalization widely
suggested refers to the narrow scope of choice sick-
ness funds have when offering health services. More
than 95 percent of the benefit package would be pre-determined by regulation (Buchner und Wasem
2003). This attempt at rationalization ignores, how-
ever, that the organization of the patient-physician
relationship does offer significant scope of choice.
The German government even legalized the possi-
bility for sickness funds to offer gate-keeping plans
with the GKV-Reform 2000 (SHI Reform Act 2000).
However no fund took advantage of this opportuni-
ty (Greß et al. 2004). Obviously it must have been
unattractive business. The government reacted by
putting the screws on.After 2004 funds were obliged
to offer optional gate-keeping plans. Such plans
require the insured to enrol with a specified general
practitioner who then serves as a gatekeeper. The
result is that specialist care is only granted following
referral. At least this is the rule. Greß et al. try to
rationalize the sickness funds’ reluctance to offer
such plans voluntarily by questioning expectations
that gate-keeping effectively results in cost savings
or an improved patient-physician relationship. The
international evidence would be inconclusive and
any cost savings proven in the private health-care
insurance sector would most probably result from
self-selection. In contrast, I prefer to explain the tra-
ditional non-existence of gate-keeping plans in
Germany by the systematically distorted demand for
health insurance.
The competing models in the German reform
debate 
In November 2002 the German Minister of Health
and Social Security, Ulla Schmidt, instructed a com-
mission of experts to work out proposals for achiev-
ing financial sustainability for the social security sys-
tems.The commission was referred to as the “Rürup-
Commission” after the commission’s chairman.With
respect to SHI, the commission did not agree on just
one model of finance. Instead, it presented two com-
peting models which became known thereafter as
the Citizens’ Insurance Scheme (Bürgerversiche-
rung) and Flat-Rate Health Premiums (pauschale
Gesundheitsprämie).2 Essential features of the
Citizens’ Insurance Scheme are:
• non-discriminatory and mandatory inclusion of
all citizens in one single system
• finance by means of a proportional tax levied on
all income up to a joined limit
By contrast, Flat-Rate Health Premiums require
• maintaining the division between private and
social health insurance
• financing SHI by fund-specific premiums that are
paid by the insured without differentiating
according to income or health-care risk 
• enforcing portability of the savings accumulated
in private health insurance plans
Prior to the elections to the German Parliament in
2005 all parties committed to the objective of a funda-
mental health care reform. While Social Democrats
and the Green Party decided to support the Citizens’
Insurance Scheme, the Christian Democrats recom-
mended a combination of traditional wage-related
contributions and Flat-Rate Health Premiums.As the
elections did not bring about clear majorities, the
Social and Christian Democrats decided to form a
grand coalition. This however meant a deadlock for
the promised health reform. In this critical situation
the Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim BMF (2005) came
up with a third reform model which was previously
proposed by Richter (2005).The model requires
• maintaining the division between private and
social health insurance
• maintaining wage-related contributions at such a
rate that allows the sickness funds of the SHI to
finance average health spending
• stopping competition in fund-specific contribu-
tion rates and switching to competition in mar-
ginal (positive or negative) premiums.
With one exception, to be discussed below, this
model became the blueprint for the reform enacted
by parliament in 2007. In the public debate the
model is named the “fund model” or the “health
fund” for short. The name is derived from the idea
that insured individuals no longer pay their contri-
butions to the specific health fund they select but to
a fictitious fund from which the selected fund
receives risk-related but not income-related premi-
ums.The contribution rate members of the SHI have
to pay on wages was fixed uniformly at 15.5 percent
from 1 January 2009 and at 14.9 percent from 1 July
2009 onwards. Hence the contribution rate is no
longer a competitive instrument.The sickness funds
compete instead with prices for marginal quantities.
This means that they charge flat marginal premiums
if the funds they receive from the health fund are
insufficient to cover costs. Vice versa, the sickness
funds may pay out surpluses in equal euro premiums
if their budget allows them to do so. In economic
terms the competition in wage-dependent contribu-
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tion rates has been replaced with an income-inde-
pendent price competition at the margin.
A more standard way to understand the new compe-
tition is by referring to vouchers.It is as if each mem-
ber enrolled in the SHI receives a voucher in return
for contributing. As the rate of contribution is uni-
form and no longer fund specific, the contribution is
an effective payroll tax. The aggregate value of the
issued vouchers equals the revenue generated by the
payroll tax.The value of an individual voucher is an
equal share after correcting for the expected risk of
health costs. The vouchers entitle their holders to
join the health plan of their own choice. If the value
of members’ vouchers allows the sickness fund to
make a surplus, the fund may distribute it to mem-
bers in flat payments. In case of a deficit, the fund
must ask members to pay an extra flat marginal pre-
mium.At least,this is the rule.In contrast to the orig-
inal proposal, the legislator introduced the one-per-
cent cap (“Überforderungsklausel”). According to
this one-percent cap, contributors to the SHI cannot
be asked to pay more than one percent of their liable
income if the extra marginal premium exceeds EUR
8. Additionally, the insured members have the right
to terminate the health plan and to enrol in a com-
peting one if the insurer charges an extra marginal
premium or increases an extra premium.
Tax-financed voucher competition is a way of redis-
tributing income without distorting the demand for
health services. As the insured keep all the savings,
they have a strong incentive to seek out plans that pro-
vide care economically.The idea is clearly not new and
even not new for health care. The first proposal for
health care based on vouchers was made by Enthoven
(1978). The most recent proposal is one by Kotlikoff
(2007). See also Kotlikoff and Burns (2004, 169).
Assessing the reform
The GKV-WSG is a reform which I believe is mov-
ing into the right direction.Whether it has moved far
enough is debatable. Problematic is the continued
division of public and private insurance. Political
barriers were too high to overcome this division.
There were also fears that closing private health
insurance plans would be unconstitutional.As far as
the SHI is concerned the reform’s provisions are,
however, essentially positive.3 The change to vouch-
er competition and the extended contractual
autonomy granted to the sickness funds are defi-
nite improvements. It is still too early to ascertain
the beneficial effects on competition. The sickness
funds still have to learn to use their new freedom.
In the past they confined themselves to collecting
members’ contributions and to distributing them to
the health service providers according to rules
which were largely exogenous. In particular, they
pushed no managed care-like innovations. As has
been argued before, market pressure did not sup-
port any moves in this direction. This has now
changed due to the new rules enacted by the GKV-
WSG.4 The reform has legalized deductibles, and
sickness funds now offer plans that include them.
First sickness funds try to attract members by
promising to distribute surplus revenue. Fur-
thermore, the funds have started to use their com-
petencies to provide managed care. In particular,
funds have started to negotiate with health care
providers on the organisation of outpatient care.
Finally, funds are now offering gate-keeping plans.
A first important step towards restricting the ac-
cess of the insured to health care providers has
been undertaken.
There is also reason to criticize the reform.A major
weakness is the introduction of the one-percent cap
(“Überforderungsklausel”).With this clause the leg-
islator aimed at sheltering insured individuals with
low incomes from financial distress. The need to
shelter has however rightly been disputed (Sach-
verständigenrat 2006). Insured members have the
right to terminate membership and to enrol in a dif-
ferent plan if the fund charges an extra marginal pre-
mium or increases an existing one. In all such cases
the insured can simply switch to a more favourable
plan. The government only has to ensure that there
are always funds making a surplus.Additionally, the
truly needy – for example the recipients of social aid
– are not required to contribute to SHI. The contri-
butions are paid for them by the competent authori-
ty. The one-percent cap has also been criticized for
reintroducing a distorting effect on competition
among sickness funds. This criticism is valid, as the
cap has the effect of shifting premium obligations
from low-income to high-income members. The
implication is that a fund may risk losing all its high
income members if it is obliged to charge an income-
3 For a more critical assessment see Sachverständigenrat (2006) or
Carrera et al. (2008).
4 Some evidence of increased competitive pressure is indicated by
the increased propensity of sickness funds to merge.The number of
independent funds has declined by 14 percent from 218 to 187 just
during the last twelve months.related extra payment.This results in distorted com-
petition (Sachverständigenrat 2006).5
Another critical point is that the particularism of the
German länder has prevented policy makers from
finding a way to reduce excess capacities in acute
hospital care.The dual financing of hospitals has not
been abolished and the sickness funds have not been
granted the right to contract selectively with hospi-
tals. The German länder only agreed in a follow-up
act (“Krankenhausfinanzierungsreformgesetz“) to
coordinate their future hospital investments.
The parts of the GKV-WSG dealing with private
insurance are also problematic. The only positive
aspect is the obligation for private insurers to offer
plans promising the same benefits as the SHI.This is
a first step towards overcoming the separation of pri-
vate and social insurance. Problematic is however
the obligation to transfer premium savings when
switching to another plan. This is problematic
because it is not clear how to comply with this oblig-
ation without triggering adverse selection.The prob-
lem originates in the so-called collective risk of pre-
miums.The most important factor of this risk is tech-
nical progress in health care.This factor implies that
future health costs can only be forecast with great
uncertainty. The practice is to update premium cal-
culations only ex post, at the time when increased
costs have effectively materialized (Nell and
Rosenbrock 2008).As this updating goes along with
increased information about individual health risks,
it implies to some non-negligible extent ex-post
redistribution instead of ex-ante insurance.The pos-
itive side of the lack of portability of premium sav-
ings is that it effectively prevents low risk individuals
from escaping redistribution.It thus shelters redistri-
bution against market forces. More than anything
else, redistribution is the government’s business, and
legislators misperceive their job if they simply
require private insurers to enable portability of
insurance premiums without prescribing how to dis-
tribute future health costs among individuals with
different health histories.
Comparing the enacted reform with the competing
reform proposals
The strengths as well as the weaknesses of the GKV-
WSG are best assessed when comparing the enacted
reform with reform proposals that have been dis-
missed by policy or that have been enacted by other
countries.6 The proposals that figured most promi-
nently in the German reform debate were the
Citizens’ Insurance Scheme and Flat-Rate Health
Premiums. As has been argued before, the Citizens’
Insurance Scheme’s primary focus has been on equi-
ty.All Germans should have indiscriminate access to
the same health plans, and all health costs should be
financed according to the principles applied to
income taxation. Such an objective is certainly not
without merit. However, the concept as such would
not contribute to increased efficiency in the health
care sector.After having introduced voucher compe-
tition, the Citizens’ Insurance Scheme is therefore a
more appealing model. The competition in tax-
financed vouchers ensures that income distribution
has no distorting effect on insurance demand. Only
under such circumstances is it justifiable to raise the
question of equitable finance. There is, no doubt,
much appeal to the idea that all goods and services
which are provided by the government and from
which no individual can be excluded for technical or
ethical reasons should be financed according to the
same set of distributive principles.
Most German health economists have been strong
promoters of Flat-Rate Health Premiums. They
argued mainly by referring to the labour market.Flat
premiums would make it possible to fight unemploy-
ment and to disconnect health costs from labour
cost.The flaw in the proposal was that it ignored the
ensuing distributive conflict when wage-related con-
tributions are replaced with wage-independent pre-
miums. Such a reform would only be politically
viable if income effects were compensated. If how-
ever all income effects are perfectly neutralized, lit-
tle or even nothing is gained with respect to labour
supply incentives (Haufler 2004; Buchholz 2005).
The only change would be that the distortions
induced by payroll tax rates would be replaced with
distortions induced by increased income tax rates.
Nothing would change effectively if the overall inci-
dence of contribution payments and taxation were
considered sacrosanct. The health-fund reform pro-
posal is the obvious result when acknowledging this.
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5 One equally has to criticize legal provisions capping marginal pre-
miums paid by sickness funds to members. The maximum amount
of feasible premiums is made a function of the contribution paid by
the individual member to the health fund. Hence maximum nega-
tive and positive premiums are related to the member’s income and
contribution payment, which should not be the case.
6 Because of a lack of space it is not possible to assess all those pro-
posals that have only been discussed among experts without any
serious chance of legal enactment. One such proposal implies the
full liberalization of premiums (Zweifel und Breuer 2003).Another
noteworthy proposal targets accumulating capital within the SHI
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It focuses on improved marginal incentives and it
leaves the distribution of income largely unchanged.
The primary objective is to eliminate the distortions
in health care demand and to leave labour market
incentives as they are.
The promoters of Flat-Rate Health Premiums often
refer to Switzerland, where such flat premiums had
been introduced in 1996 (Leu et al. 2008). Whether
Switzerland can serve as a good example for effi-
ciency in health care is however not clear. Life
expectancy is admittedly high; it is even the second
highest in the OECD.Yet health spending as a share
of GDP equally ranks second (Figure 1). However
this may be interpreted, Switzerland does not excel
by an obvious efficiency lead.This may be surprising
given that the method of financing health costs is
basically non-distorting and it clearly calls for an
explanation. Leu et al. (2008, 150) list various defi-
ciencies, the most critical of which is that too little
autonomy is granted to the insurance companies.
Swiss insurers are not entitled to contract selectively
with the providers of health services nor are they
entitled to negotiate fees. Hence their method of
financing would allow them to pass on efficiency
gains to the insured but they lack the legal compe-
tence to generate any.Health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs) enjoy more autonomy (Leu et al.
2008, 114). There is even some evidence that this
autonomy pays off. Depending on the study the cost
reductions achieved by Swiss HMOs are in the order
of 20–37 percent even after controlling for self-selec-
tion of individuals in good health. The share of the
insured enrolling in HMOs is however still rather
small. It amounts to roughly 15 percent of the man-
aged care market, which accounts for just over 12
percent of the insured Swiss population. A true
obstacle is that the maximum premium reductions
HMOs can pass on to the insured are limited by law.
Apart from Switzerland, the Netherlands is often
cited as an example of successful health care reform
(Enthoven et al. 2007; Greß et al. 2007; Stoelwinder
2008). Technically speaking the Dutch method of
finance can be seen as a combination of tax-financed
vouchers and Flat-Rate Health Premiums. About 50
percent of total expenditures is financed by income
dependent contributions (Leu et al. 2008, 74). 5 per-
cent is a government subsidy and 45 percent is
financed by flat premiums which in 2007 amounted to
EUR 1,144 on average. The flat premiums must be
the same for every insured member under the same
health plan,but they can vary among insurers.Hence
the demand for insurance can be considered to be
undistorted.As the reform was not enacted until 2006
it is still too early to evaluate the reform’s success
empirically. There is however one critical issue that
policy makers should watch carefully. This issue is
market power in the demand for insurance. About
57 percent of the insured have signed collective con-
tracts which offer discounts of up to 10 percent and
which are negotiated between the insurers on the one
side and the employers or trade unions on the other
side.There is good reason to believe that such collec-
tive bargaining is more of an obstacle than a help for
the development of efficiency-enhancing managed
care.Managed care is still in is infancy in the Nether-
lands (Leu et al. 2008, 17) and it might be unduly dif-
ficult to market the efficiency gains of managed care
if such plans have to compete with collectively nego-
tiated plans.
A tentative outlook
According to Richter’s proposal (2005) the switch to
voucher competition in the German SHI should only
be the first stage of a more fundamental reform in
health care and its finance. At the second stage the
payroll-tax finance should be integrated into the gen-
eral system of taxation.This second part of the reform
would then offer a good opportunity to redesign the
roles of private and public insurance.The Netherlands
had to meet similar challenges years ago and they
have showed how to overcome them.From an econo-
mist’s point of view there is hardly any reason why
public and private insurance companies should not
compete for insurance demand on an equal footing.
Whether for-profit or non-for-profit companies better
serve people’s needs can only be determined by mar-
ket outcome. Insurance plans with risk-rated premi-
ums, which characterize private insurance, will under
no circumstances lose importance. They will only be
limited to supplementary insurance plans. In the long
run most Germans will find themselves signing up for
two plans:one is tax financed and it only covers health
care to an extent specified by experts to be basic.7The
other plan is risk-rated and it covers non-basic health
care.To prevent such a system from suffering unduly
from adverse selection,however,all relevant informa-
tion about individual health costs must be made avail-
able to the insurer with which the individual wants to
sign up a supplementary plan.
7 Even now experts decide on what is included in the benefit pack-
age offered by SHI. So this part is no change.References
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